Jamming The Oil, Kicking The Sand: The Strait Of Hormuz And The Developing Situation In Iran

On June 22, 2025, the US entered the Iran/Israel conflict. The escalation threatens a spillover, increasing the likelihood that a greater number of people and organizations in the region will be impacted. This squeeze will be felt most at the Strait of Hormuz and its 24-mile-wide chokepoint, through which one fifth of the world’s oil flows daily.

While it has been widely discussed, it is unlikely that Iran will close the Strait. Such an act would be impossible to enforce without causing a greater escalation than Iran is willing to risk. Instead, Iran is intensifying radio signals to jam the GPS capabilities of ships’ automatic identification systems (AIS). After increasing by 60% since June 22, these attacks have shrunk traffic by 20% and affected over 1,600 vessels. This is a new risk territory for firms relying on automated GPS.

Risk managers across all sectors should examine what has gone well and what has failed for other organizations operating nearby. Current strategies offer a case study in operational resilience, and heads of risk should consider:

• Building adaptability into their systems.

  A fast redesign of itineraries has proven invaluable for regional operations. By avoiding night-time travel, daylight operations reduce navigational risks and allow visual assessments of obstacles. The takeaway here – for any risk manager – is that itinerary flexibility is not innate: it must be deliberately built into the operational planning phase and supported by a careful balance between cross-functional coordination and decentralized decision-making.

• Using multi-layered strategies.

  Overlapping tools – such as real-time satellite data and local intelligence – are essential to overcome the ‘single points of failure’ that an overreliance on single systems introduces. Heads of risk must look to the ‘improbable’ events that will undermine operating systems and treat them not as outliers, but as constraints.

• Maintaining positive rather than negative proactivity.
  Broadcasting the nationality of the vessel has emerged as a more aggressive tactic: ‘Vsl no link Israel’ was sent out from one Singaporean-flagged ship to deter jamming attacks. The problem with tactics like these is that they prioritize action over effectiveness by shifting the burden of action/inaction to another entity. While it may feel good to act immediately in a hostile environment, the line between responsiveness and exposure must be carefully managed.
  

Ultimately, effective operational risk management across hostile regions must balance structural flexibility with a type of proactivity that is responsible rather than impulsive. CROs must learn the difference today. Tomorrow will be too late.

To read more, check out Verdantix insights on risk management.